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Explicit Formulas for Repeated Games with Absorbing States∗
Rida LARAKI†
January 26, 2009
Abstract
Explicit formulas for the asymptotic value limλ→0 v(λ) and the asymptotic minmax limλ→0 w(λ)
of finite λ-discounted absorbing games are provided. New simple proofs for the existence of
the limits as λ goes zero are given. Similar characterizations for stationary Nash equilibrium
payoffs are obtained. The results may be extended to absorbing games with compact action
sets and jointly continuous payoff functions.
1 Introduction
Aumann and Maschler [1] introduced and studied long interaction two player zero-sum repeated
games with incomplete information. They introduced the asymptotic and uniform approaches
and obtained an explicit formulas for the asymptotic value when a player is fully informed (the
famous Cav(u) theorem). Mertens and Zamir [8] completed this work and obtained their elegant
system of functional equations [8] that characterizes the asymptotic value of a repeated game with
incomplete information on both sides. Unfortunately, very few repeated games have an explicit
characterization of the asymptotic value .
Stochastic games are repeated games in which a state variable follows a markov chain con-
trolled by the actions of the players. Shapley [10] introduced the two player zero-sum model with
finitely many states and actions (i.e. the finite model). He proved the existence of the value
of the λ-discounted game v (λ) by introducing a dynamic programming principle (the Shapley
operator).
Kohlberg [5] proved the existence of the asymptotic value v = limλ→0 v (λ) in the subclass
of finite absorbing games (i.e., stochastic games in which only one state is non-absorbing). His
operator appraoch uses the additional information obtained from the derivative of the Shapley
operator at λ = 0 to deduce the existence of limλ→0 v (λ) and its characterization via variational
inequalities.
Laraki ([6], [7]) used a variational approach to study games in which each player controls
a martingale (including Aumann and Maschler repeated games). As in differential games with
fixed duration, the approach starts with the dynamic programming principle, follows with an
optimal strategy for some player for a fixed discounted factor λ, relax the constraint of the other
player and lets the discount factor λ carefully tend to zero. This allows to show the existence of
limλ→0 v (λ) and its variational characterization.
The same approach gives, for absorbing games, a new proof for the existence of limλ→0 v (λ)
and its characterization as the value of a one-shot game. When the probability of absorption is
controlled by only one player (as in the big match), the formula can be simplified to the value of
∗I would like to thank Michel Balinski, Eilon Solan, Sylvain Sorin and Xavier Venel for their very useful
comments.
†Main position: CNRS, Laboratoire d’Econome´trie, De´partement d’Economie, Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau,
France. Associated to: E´quipe Combinatoire, Universite´ Paris 6. Email: rida.laraki@polytechnique.edu
1
an underlying finite game. Coulomb [3] provided another explicit formula for limλ→0 v (λ) using
an algebraic approach.
Rosenberg and Sorin [9] extended the Kohlberg result to absorbing games when action sets are
infinite but compact and payoffs and transitions are separately continuous. However, no explicit
formula is known for v.
The minmax w (λ) of a multi-player λ-discounted absorbing game is the level at which a team
of players could punish another player. From Bewley and Kohlberg [2] one deduces the existence
of limw (λ) for any finite absorbing game. However, no explicit formula exists and it is not known
if the limit exists in infinite absorbing games.
The variational approach allows (1) to prove the existence of the asymptotic minmax w =
limλ→0 w (λ) of any multi-player jointly continuous compact absorbing game and (2) provides
an explicit formula for w. Similar formulas could be obtained for stationary Nash equilibrium
payoffs.
2 The value
Consider two finite sets I and J , two (payoff) functions f , g from I×J to [−1, 1] and a (probability
transition) function p from I × J to [0, 1] .
The game is played in discrete time. At stage t = 1, 2, ... player I chooses at random it ∈ I
(according to some mixed action xt ∈ ∆(I) 1) and, simultaneously, player J chooses at random
jt ∈ J (according to some mixed action yt ∈ ∆(J) 2):
(i) the payoff is f (it, jt) at stage t;
(ii) with probability 1− p (it, jt) the game is absorbed and the payoff is g (it, jt) in all future
stages;
and
(iii) with probability p (it, jt) the interaction continues (the situation is repeated at step t+1).
If the stream of payoffs is r(t), t = 1, 2, ..., the λ-discounted-payoff of the game is
∑∞
t=1 λ(1−
λ)t−1r(t). Player I maximizes the expected discounted-payoff and player J minimizes that payoff.
M+(I) = {α = (αi)i∈I : αi ∈ [0,+∞)} is the set of positive measures on I (the I-dimensional
positive orthant). For any i and j, let p∗(i, j) = 1 − p(i, j) and f∗(i, j) = [1− p(i, j)] × g(i, j).
For any (α, j) ∈ M+(I) × J and ϕ : I × J → [−1, 1] , ϕ is extended linearly as follows ϕ(α, j) =∑
i∈I α
iϕ(i, j). Note that ∆(I) ⊂M+(I).
Proposition 1 (Shapley 1953) Gλ has a value, v (λ) . It is the unique real in [0, 1] satisfying,
v (λ) = max
x∈∆(I)
min
j∈J
[λf(x, j) + (1− λ) p(x, j)v (λ) + (1− λ) f∗(x, j)] . (1)
Equation (1) implies that player I has an optimal stationary strategy (that plays the same
mixed action x at each period). This implies in particular that the proposition holds even if the
players have no memory or do not observe past actions.
Example: a quitting-game
C Q
C 0 1∗
Q 1∗ 0∗
The game stops with probability 1 if one of the players plays Q. There are two absorbing payoffs
1 and 0 (they are marked, as usual, with a ∗). The absorbing payoff 1 is achieved at some period
1∆(I) =
{
(xi)i∈I : x
i
∈ [0, 1],
∑
i∈I x
i = 1
}
is the set probabilities over I .
2∆(J) =
{
(yj)j∈J : y
j
∈ [0, 1],
∑
j∈J y
j = 1
}
is the set of probabilities over J .
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if (C,Q) or (Q,C) is played. The absorbing payoff 0∗ is achieved if (Q,Q) is played. The game is
non-absorbed if both players decide to continue and play (C,C).
Consider the following strategy stationary profile in which player I plays at each period
(xC, (1−x)Q) and player 2 (yC, (1−y)Q). The corresponding discounted payoff rλ(x, y) satisfies
rλ(x, y) = xy (λ× 0 + (1− λ) rλ(x, y)) + ((1− x)y + (1− y)x) ,
so that
rλ(x, y) =
x+ y − 2xy
1− xy(1− λ) .
The value vλ ∈ [0, 1] satisfies:
vλ = value

 C QC (1− λ)vλ 1
Q 1 0


= max
x∈[0,1]
min
y∈[0,1]
[xy(1− λ)vλ + x(1− y) + y(1− x)]
= min
y∈[0,1]
max
x∈[0,1]
[xy(1− λ)vλ + x(1− y) + y(1− x)] .
It may be checked that
vλ = xλ = yλ =
1−√λ
1− λ .
The value and the optimal strategies are not rational fractions of λ (but admit a puiseux series in
power of λ). Bewley and Kohlberg [2] show this to hold for all finite stochastic games and deduce
from it the existence of lim v (λ).
Lemma 2 v (λ) satisfies
v (λ) = max
x∈∆(I)
min
j∈J
λf(x, j) + (1− λ) f∗(x, j)
λp(x, j) + p∗(x, j)
.
Proof. If in the λ-discounted game, player I plays the stationary strategy x and player J
plays a pure stationary strategy j ∈ J , the λ-discounted reward r (λ, x, j) satisfies:
r (λ, x, j) = λf(x, j) + (1− λ) p(x, j)r (λ, x, j) + (1− λ) f∗(x, j).
Since p∗ = (1− p),
r (λ, x, j) =
λf(x, j) + (1− λ) f∗(x, j)
λp(x, j) + p∗(x, j)
.
The maximizer has a stationary optimal strategy and the minimizer has a pure stationary best
reply: this proves the lemma.
In the following, α ⊥ x means that for every i ∈ I, xi > 0⇒ αi = 0.
Theorem 3 As λ goes to zero v (λ) converges to
v = sup
x∈∆(I)
sup
α⊥x∈M+(I)
min
j∈J
(
f∗(x, j)
p∗(x, j)
1{p∗(x,j)>0} +
f(x, j) + f∗(α, j)
p(x, j) + p∗(α, j)
1{p∗(x,j)=0}
)
.
Proof. Let w = limn→∞ v (λn) be an accumulation point of v (λ).
Step 1: Consider an optimal stationary strategy x (λn) for player I and go to the limit using
Shapley’s dynamic programming principle. From the formula of v(λn), there exists x (λn) ∈ ∆(I)
such that for every j ∈ J,
v (λn) ≤ λnf(x(λn), j) + (1− λn) f
∗(x(λn), j)
λnp(x(λn), j) + p∗(x(λn), j)
. (2)
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By the compactness of ∆(I) it may be supposed that x (λn)→ x.
Case 1: p∗(x, j) > 0. Letting λn go to zero implies w ≤ f
∗(x,j)
p∗(x,j) .
Case 2: p∗(x, j) =
∑
i∈I x
ip∗(i, j) = 0. Thus,
∑
i∈S(x) p
∗(i, j) = 0 where S(x) = {i ∈ I : xi >
0} is the support of x. Let α(λn) =
(
xi(λn)
λn
1{xi=0}
)
i∈I
∈M+(I) so that α(λn) ⊥ x. Consequently,
∑
i∈I
xi (λn)
λn
p∗(i, j) =
∑
i/∈S(x)
xi (λn)
λn
p∗(i, j)
=
∑
i∈I
αi (λn) p
∗(i, j)
= p∗(α (λn) , j),
and ∑
i∈I
xi (λn)
λn
f∗(i, j) =
∑
i∈I
αi (λn) f
∗(i, j) = f∗(α (λn) , j),
so, from equation (2), and because p(x, j) = 1,
w ≤ lim
n→∞
inf
f(x, j) + (1− λn) f∗(α(λn), j)
p(x, j) + p∗(α(λn), j)
. (3)
Since J is finite, for any ε > 0, there is N(ε) such that, for every j ∈ J , w ≤ f(x,j)+f
∗(α(λN(ε)),j)
p(x,j)+p∗(α(λN(ε)),j)
+ε.
Consequently, w ≤ v.
Step 2: Construct a strategy for player I in the λn-discounted game that guarantees v as
λn → 0. Let (αε, xε) ∈M+(I)×∆(I) be ε-optimal for the maximizer in the formula of v. For λn
small enough, let xε(λn) be proportional to xε+λnαε (xε(λn) = µn(xε+λnαε) for some µn > 0).
Let r(λn) be the unique real in the interval [0, 1] that satisfies,
r(λn) = min
j∈J
[
λn [f(xε(λn), j)] + (1− λn) (p(xε(λn), j)) r (λn)
+ (1− λn) f∗(xε(λn), j)
]
. (4)
By the linearity of f , p, f∗ and p∗ on x,
r (λn) = min
j
λnf(xε + λnαε, j) + (1− λn) f∗(xε + λnαε, j)
λnp(xε + λnαε, j) + p∗(xε + λnαε, j)
= min
j
λnf(xε, j) + λ
2
nf(αε, j) + (1− λn) f∗(xε, j) + (1− λn)λnf∗(αε, j)
λnp(xε, j) + λ2np(αε, j) + p
∗(xε, j) + λnp∗(αε, j)
.
Also, v(λn) ≥ r(λn) since r(λn) is the payoff of player I if he plays the stationary strategy xε(λn).
Let jλn ∈ J be an optimal stationary pure best response for player J against xε(λn) (an element
of the argmin in (4)). Since J is finite and r(λn) bounded, one can switch to a subsequence and
suppose that jλn is constant (= j) and that r(λn) → r. If p∗(xε, j) > 0 then r = f
∗(xε,j)
p∗(xε,j)
. If
p∗(xε, j) = 0, clearly r =
f(xε,j)+f∗(αε,j)
p(xε,j)+p∗(αε,j)
. Consequently, w ≥ v.
This proof shows that for each ε > 0, a player always admits an ε-optimal strategy in the
λ-discounted game proportional to xε + λαε for all λ small enough. The quitting game example
shows that a 0-optimal strategy of the λ-discounted game is not always of that form. This
identifies the asymptotic value as the value of what may be called the asymptotic game.
For any (α, β) ∈ M+(I) ×M+(J) and ϕ : I × J → [−1, 1] , ϕ is extended linearly as follows
ϕ(α, β) =
∑
i∈I,j∈J α
iβjϕ(i, j). For player I let
Λ(I) = {(x, α) ∈ ∆(I)×M+(I) : α ⊥ x}
and similarly for player J .
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Corollary 4 v satisfies the following equations:
v = sup
(x,α)∈Λ(I)
inf
(y,β)∈Λ(J)
(
f∗(x,y)
p∗(x,y)1{p∗(x,y)>0}
+ f(x,y)+f
∗(α,y)+f∗(x,β)
p(x,y)+p∗(α,y)+p∗(x,β) 1{p∗(x,y)=0}
)
= inf
(y,β)∈Λ(I)
sup
(x,α)∈Λ(I)
(
f∗(x,y)
p∗(x,y)1{p∗(x,y)>0}
+ f(x,y)+f
∗(α,y)+f∗(x,β)
p(x,y)+p∗(α,y)+p∗(x,β) 1{p∗(x,y)=0}
)
= sup
(x,α)∈Λ(I)
inf
y∈∆(J)
(
f∗(x,y)
p∗(x,y)1{p∗(x,y)>0}
+ f(x,y)+f
∗(α,y)
p(x,y)+p∗(α,y) 1{p∗(x,y)=0}
)
.
Proof. Consider an ε-optimal strategy xε(λ) proportional to xε + λαε in the λ-discounted
game. Taking any strategy of Player J proportional to y (λ) = y + λβ yields
v (λ)− ε ≤ λf(xε + λαε, y + λβ) + (1− λ) f
∗(xε + λαε, y + λβ)
λp(xε + λαε, y + λβ) + p∗(xε + λαε, y + λβ)
.
p∗(xε, y) > 0 implies v = lim v (λ) ≤ f
∗(xε,y)
p∗(xε,y)
. If p∗(xε, y) = 0 then f
∗(xε, y) = 0. Using the
multi-linearity of f , f∗, p and p∗ and dividing by λ imply:
v (λ)− ε ≤ f(xε + λαε, y + λβ) + (1− λ) f
∗(αε, y) + (1− λ) f∗(xε, β) + (1− λ)λf∗(αε, β)
p(xε + λαε, y + λβ) + p∗(αε, y) + f∗(xε, β) + λp∗(αε, β)
.
Going to the limit,
v ≤ f(xε, y) + f
∗(αε, y) + f
∗(xε, β)
p(xε, y) + p∗(αε, y) + f∗(xε, β)
,
which holds for all (y, β). Thus,
v ≤ sup
(x,α)∈Λ(I)
inf
(y,β)∈Λ(J)
(
f∗(x,y)
p∗(x,y)1{p∗(x,y)>0}
+ f(x,y)+f
∗(α,y)+f∗(x,β)
p(x,y)+p∗(α,y)+p∗(x,β) 1{p∗(x,y)=0}
)
.
And similarly for the other inequality. Since the inf sup is always higher than the sup inf the first
two equalities follow.
Taking β = 0 in the last inequality implies:
v ≤ sup
(x,α)∈Λ(I)
inf
y∈∆(J)
(
f∗(x,y)
p∗(x,y)1{p∗(x,y)>0}
+ f(x,y)+f
∗(α,y)
p(x,y)+p∗(α,y)1{p∗(x,y)=0}
)
,
and from the formula of v in theorem 3, one obtains the last equality of the corollary.
3 Absorption controlled by one player
Consider the following zero-sum absorbing game (the big-match).
L R
T 1∗ 0∗
B 0 1
It is easy to show that v(λ) = 12 and that the unique optimal strategy for player I is to play T
with probability λ1+λ . Consequently, v =
1
2 which also happens to be the value of the underlying
one-shot game
(
1 0
0 1
)
. On the other hand, the asymptotic value of the quitting-game is 1,
5
which is not the value of the underlying one-shot game
(
0 1
1 0
)
. A natural question arises:
what are the absorbing games when v is the value of an underlying one-shot game?
A game is partially-controlled by player I if the the transition function p(i, j) depends only
on i (but not the associated payoffs).
Proposition 5 If a zero-sum absorbing game is partially-controlled by player I, the asymptotic
value equals the value of the underlying game, namely:
v = max
x∈∆(I)
min
j∈J
∑
i/∈I∗
xif(i, j) +
∑
i∈I∗
xig(i, j)
where I∗ = {i : p∗(i) > 0} is the set of absorbing actions of player I.
Proof. Step 1 v ≤ u.
Let xε ∈ ∆(I) and αε ⊥ xε ∈M+(I) be ε-optimal in the formula of v. If p∗(xε) > 0 then,
v−ε ≤ min
j∈J
(
f∗(xε, j)
p∗(xε)
)
= min
j∈J
(∑
i∈I
xip∗(i)
p∗(xε)
g(i, j)
)
= min
j∈J
(∑
i∈I∗
xip∗(i)
p∗(xε)
g(i, j)
)
≤ max
z∈∆(I∗)
min
j∈J
∑
i∈I∗
zig(i, j) ≤ u.
If p∗(xε) = 0 then x
i
ε = 0 for i ∈ I∗ and p∗(i) = 0 when i /∈ I∗ so that
v − ε ≤ min
j∈J
(
f(xε, j) + f
∗(αε, j)
p(xε) + p∗(αε)
)
= min
j∈J
(∑
i/∈I∗
xiε
p(xε) + p∗(αε)
f(i, j) +
∑
i∈I∗
αiεp
∗(i)
p(xε) + p∗(αε)
g(i, j)
)
.
But when i /∈ I∗, p(i) = 1, thus:
v − ε ≤ min
j∈J
(∑
i/∈I∗
xiεp(i)
p(xε) + p∗(αε)
f(i, j) +
∑
i∈I∗
αiεp
∗(i)
p(xε) + p∗(αε)
g(i, j)
)
≤ u.
Step 2 v ≥ u.
Let x0 be optimal for player I in the one shot matrix game associated with u. Define (x1, α1)
as follows. If p∗(x0) = 0, let (x1, α1) = (x0, 0). This clearly implies that v ≥ u. If p∗(x0) > 0 then
for all i ∈ I∗, let xi1 = 0 (so that x1 is non-absorbing) and for i /∈ I∗ let αi1 = 0. This will imply
that,
v ≥ min
j∈J
(
f(x1, j) + f
∗(α1, j)
p(x1) + p∗(α1)
)
= min
j∈J
(∑
i/∈I∗
xi1
p(x1) + p∗(α1)
f(i, j) +
∑
i∈I∗
αi1p
∗(i)
p(x1) + p∗(α1)
g(i, j)
)
= min
j∈J
(∑
i/∈I∗
xi1p(i)
p(x1) + p∗(α1)
f(i, j) +
∑
i∈I∗
αi1p
∗(i)
p(x1) + p∗(α1)
g(i, j)
)
.
Complete the definition of (x1, α1) as follows. For i /∈ I∗, let xi0 = x
i
1p(i)
p(x1)+p∗(α1)
(x1 is propor-
tional to x0 on the I\I∗) and for i ∈ I∗ let xi0 = α
i
1p
∗(i)
p(x1)+p∗(α1)
(α1 is proportional to x0 on I
∗).
Consequently,
v ≥ min
j∈J

∑
i/∈I
xi0g(i, j) +
∑
i∈I
xi0g(i, j)

 = u.
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4 The minmax
A team of N players (named I) play against player (J). Assume the finiteness of all the strategy
sets. Each player k in team I has a finite set of actions Ik. Player J has a finite set of actions
J . Let I = I1 × ... × IN and f , g from I × J → [−1, 1] and p : I × J → [0, 1] . The game
is played as above, except that (1) at each period, players in team I randomize independently
(they are not allowed to correlate their random moves); and (2) team I minimizes the expected
λ-discounted-payoff and player J maximizes the payoff (players in I try to punish player J).
Let ∆ = ∆(I1) × ... × ∆(IN ), p∗ (·) = 1 − p (·) , f∗ (·) = p∗ (·) × g (·) and M+ = M+(I1) ×
... ×M+(IN ). For x ∈ X, j ∈ J, k ∈ N and α ∈ M+, a function ϕ : I × J → [−1, 1] is extended
multi-linearly as follows:
ϕ(x, j) =
∑
i=(i1,...,iN)∈I
xi
1
1 × ...× xi
N
N ϕ(i, j)
ϕ(αk, x−k, j) =
∑
i=(i1,...,iN)∈I
xi
1
1 × ...× xi
k−1
k−1 × αi
k
k × xi
k+1
k+1 ...× xi
N
n ϕ(i, j).
Let w (λ) denote the minimum payoff that team I can guarantee against player J. From Bewley
and Kohlberg [2] one can deduce the existence of w (λ) . However, no explicit formula exists.
Theorem 6 w (λ) = minx∈∆maxj∈J
λf(x,j)+(1−λ)f∗(x,j)
λp(x,j)+p∗(x,j) and, as λ→ 0, converges to
w = inf
(x,α)∈∆×M+:∀k,αk⊥xk
max
j∈J

 f
∗(x,j)
p∗(x,j)1{p∗(x,j)>0}
+
f(x,j)+
∑N
k=1 f
∗(αk ,x−k,j)
p(x,j)+
∑N
k=1 p
∗(αk ,x−k,j)
1{p∗(x,j)=0}


= inf
(x,α)∈∆×M+:∀k,αk⊥xk
max
y∈∆(J)

 f
∗(x,y)
p∗(x,y)1{p∗(x,y)>0}
+
f(x,y)+
∑N
k=1 f
∗(αk ,x−k,y)
p(x,y)+
∑N
k=1 p
∗(αk ,x−k,y)
1{p∗(x,y)=0}

 .
Proof. For the first formula, follow the ideas in the proof of theorem 3 and corollary 4. Let
v = limn→∞w (λn) where λn → 0.
Modifications in step 1 in theorem 3: let x (λn)→ x be such that for every j ∈ J,
w (λn) ≥ λnf(x(λn), j) + (1− λn) f
∗(x(λn), j)
λnp(x(λn), j) + p∗(x(λn), j)
.
Let y(λn) = x (λn)− x→ 0 so that:
p∗(x(λn), j) =
∑
i=(i1,...,iN)∈I
xi
1
1 (λn)× ...× xi
N
N (λn)p(i, j)
=
∑
i=(i1,...,iN)∈I
(yi
1
1 (λn) + x
i1
1 )× ...× (yi
N
N (λn) + x
iN
N )p(i, j)
= p∗(x, j) +
N∑
k=1
p∗(yk(λn), x−k, j) + o(
N∑
k=1
p∗(yk(λn), x−k, j))
If p∗(x, j) > 0 then w ≥ f∗(x,j)p∗(x,j) . If p∗(x, j) = 0 and if αk(λn) =
(
xi
k
k
(λn)
λn
1{
xi
k
k
=0
}
)
ik∈Ik
∈M+(Ik)
then αk(λn) ⊥ xk and
p∗(
x(λn)
λn
, j) =
N∑
k=1
p∗(αk(λn), x−k, j) + o(
N∑
k=1
p∗(αk(λn), x−k, j))
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and the same is true for f∗ so that
w ≥ lim sup
n→∞
f(x, j) +
∑N
k=1 f
∗(αk(λn), x−k, j)
p(x, j) +
∑N
k=1 f
∗(αk(λn), x−k, j)
which implies that w ≥ v.
Modifications in step 2 in theorem 3: take (αε, xε) to be ε-optimal for the minimizer in the
formula of w and define xεk(λn) to be proportional to x
ε
k + λnα
ε
k and deduce that w ≤ v.
For the second formula, follow corollary 4. For each ε > 0, the proof above implies that
players in I have an ε-optimal strategy (xεk(λ))k∈I where x
ε
k(λ) is proportional to x
ε
k +λα
ε
k in the
λ-discounted game for all λ small enough. This implies that for any y ∈ ∆(J),
w (λ) + ε ≥ λf(x
ε
k(λ), y) + (1− λ) f∗(xεk(λ), y)
λp(xεk(λ), y) + p
∗(xεk(λ), y)
.
where the right hand is a fractional function of λ. Consequently, it admits a limit which may be
computed as in step 1 (using the multi-linearity of payoffs and transitions). This will imply that
w ≥ inf
x∈∆
inf
α∈M+:∀k,αk⊥xk
max
y∈∆(J)

 f
∗(x,y)
p∗(x,y)1{p∗(x,y)>0}
+
f(x,y)+
∑N
k=1 f
∗(αk,x−k,y)
p(x,y)+
∑N
k=1 p
∗(αk ,x−k,y)
1{p∗(x,y)=0}

 .
The first formula of w and the fact that J ⊂ ∆(J) imply the other inequality.
5 Stationary Nash Equilibria
Consider a N player absorbing game where each player k ∈ N has a finite set of actions Ik.
Define the payoff functions fk : I → [−1, 1] and gk : I → [−1, 1], k ∈ {1, ..., N} and a probability
transition p : I → [0, 1] where I = I1 × ... × IN . The game is played as above except that if at
stage t player k = 1, ..., N chooses the action ikt ∈ Ik then player k receives fk
(
i1t , ..., i
N
t
)
and
if the game is absorbed he receives gk
(
i1t , ..., i
N
t
)
. From Fink [4], the λ-discounted game admits
a stationary Nash equilibrium. Notations and calculus as above allow to establish that xλ ∈ ∆
with the corresponding payoff uλ =
(
u1λ, ..., u
N
λ
) ∈ RN is a stationary equilibrium iff:
xkλ ∈ arg max
xk∈∆(Ik)
λfk(xk, x−kλ ) + (1− λ)f∗k(xk, x−kλ )
λp(xk, x−kλ ) + p
∗(xk, x−kλ )
uλ = max
xk∈∆(Ik)
λfk(xk, x−kλ ) + (1− λ)f∗k(xk, x−kλ )
λp(xk, x−kλ ) + p
∗(xk, x−kλ )
,
Arguments as above prove the following.
Theorem 7 Let u = (u1, ..., uN ) ∈ [−1, 1]N be an accumulation point of uλ. Then u should be
a limit equilibrium payoff of the game where the set of strategies of player k is:
Λ(Ik) =
{
(xk, αk) ∈ ∆(Ik)×M+(Ik) : αk ⊥ xk
}
and where the payoff function of player k is
f∗k(x)
p∗(x)
1{p∗(x)>0} +
fk(x) +
∑N
j=1 f
∗k(αj , x−j)
p(x) +
∑N
j=1 p
∗(αj , x−j)
1{p∗(x)=0}
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More precisely, for any ε > 0, there exists (xε, αε) such that:
uk = lim
ε→0
f∗k(xε)
p∗(xε)
1{p∗(xε)>0} +
fk(xε) +
∑N
j=1 f
∗k(αjε, x
−j
ε )
p(xε) +
∑N
j=1 p
∗(αjε, x
−j
ε )
1{p∗(xε)=0}
≥ sup
(xk,αk)∈Λ(Ik)


f∗k(xk,x−kε )
p∗(xk ,x−kε )
1{p∗(xk ,x−kε )>0}
+
fk(xk,x−kε )+f
∗k(αk ,x−kε )+
∑N
j 6=k f
∗j(αjε,x
k,x
−{k,j}
ε )
p(xk,x−kε )+p∗k(αk ,x
−k
ε )+
∑N
j 6=k p
∗(αjε,xk,x
−{k,j}
ε )
1{p∗(xk ,x−kε )=0}

− ε
6 Compact continuous games
Let us extend the model of zero-sum game. I and J are now assumed to be compact and metric
sets. The game is separately (resp. jointly) continuous if f , g and p are separately (resp. jointly)
continuous functions on I×J . ∆(K), K = I, J, is the set of Borel probability measures on K and
M+(K) is the set of Borel positive measure onK. They are endowed with the weak* topology. For
(α, β) ∈M+(I)×M+(J) and ϕ : I × J → [−1, 1] measurable, ϕ(α, β) =
∫
I×J ϕ(i, j)dα(i)dβ(j).
This framework was introduced in Rosenberg and Sorin [9]. Following the approach of
Kohlberg [5], Rosenberg and Sorin considered the Shapley operator r → Φ(λ, r) where
Φ(λ, r) = max
x∈∆(I)
min
y∈∆(J)
[λf(x, y) + (1− λ) p(x, y)r + (1− λ) f∗(x, y)]
= min
y∈∆(J)
max
x∈∆(I)
[λf(x, y) + (1− λ) p(x, y)r + (1− λ) f∗(x, y)] .
The operator is well defined and the existence of the value is guaranteed via Sion’s minmax
theorem. As Shapley did, the operator is (1−λ)-contracting so that the value of the λ-discounted
game v(λ) is the unique fixed point. Kohlberg [5], in finite absorbing games and Rosenberg and
Sorin [9] in separately continuous absorbing games proved the existence of v = lim v(λ) and
provided a variational characterization of v using the information obtained from the derivative of
Φ(λ, r) around λ ≈ 0. Notations for a multi-player absorbing game are introduced similarly.
Theorem 8 If the game is jointly continuous, all the results proved above for finite games still
hold (for lim v(λ), limw(λ) and Nash equilibria).
Proof. Let us show how the first part of theorem 3 is modified. Let w = limn→∞ v (λn)
where λn → 0. Take an optimal strategy x(λn) of player I in the λn-discounted game and
suppose w.l.o.g. that it converges to some x. Consider any strategy j of Player J so that:
v (λn) ≤ λnf(x(λn), j) + (1− λn) f
∗(x(λn), j)
λnp(x(λn), j) + p∗(x(λn), j)
If p∗(x, j) > 0 then v ≤ f∗(x,j)p∗(x,j) . If p∗(x, j) = 0 then p∗(i, j) = 0 on i ∈ S(x) the support of
x. Define α(λn) ∈ M+(I) to be dα(λn)(i) = dx(λn)(i)λn 1{i/∈S(x)}. Let sn ≥ 0 to be such that
α(λn) = snσ(λn) and σ(λn) ∈ ∆(I) and assume w.l.o.g. that σ(λn) → σ and sn → t ∈ [0,+∞]
(by compactness of ∆(I)). Using joint continuity, the fact that p(x, j) = 1 and that payoffs are
uniformly bounded by 1 imply that for any ε > 0, there is N(ε) such that for all n ≥ N(ε) and
all j ∈ J
f(x(λn), j) + (1− λn) f∗(α(λn), j)
p(x(λn), j) + p∗(α(λn), j)
≤ f(x, j) + ε+ f
∗(α(λn), j) − λnf∗(α(λn), j)
p(x, j) − ε+ p∗(α(λn), j)
≤ f(x, j) + f
∗(α(λn), j)
p(x, j) + p∗(α(λn), j)
+
2ε
1− ε + λn
9
Consequently,
w ≤ sup
x∈∆(I)
sup
α⊥x∈M+(I)
min
j∈J
(
f∗(x, j)
p∗(x, j)
1{p∗(x,j)>0} +
f(x, j) + f∗(α, j)
p(x, j) + p∗(α, j)
1{p∗(x,j)=0}
)
.
Step 2 of theorem 1 needs no modification. The other proofs are adapted in a similar way.
References
[1] Aumann R.J. and M. Maschler (1995). Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, M.I.T.
Press.
[2] Bewley, T. and Kohlberg E. (1976). The Asymptotic Theory of Stochastic Games. Mathe-
matics of Operation Research, 1, 197-208.
[3] Coulomb, J. M. (2001). Repeated Games with Absorbing States and Signaling Structure.
Mathematics of Operation Research, 26, 286-303.
[4] Fink, A. M. (1964). Equilibrium in a Stochastic N -Person Game. J. Sci. Hiroshima Univ.
28, 89-93.
[5] Kohlberg, E. (1974). Repeated Games with Absorbing States. Annals of Statistics, 2, 724-
738.
[6] Laraki, R. (2001a). The Splitting Game and Applications. International Journal of Game
Theory, 30, 359-376.
[7] Laraki, R. (2001b). Variational Inequalities, System of Functional Equations, and Incomplete
Information Repeated Games. SIAM Journal of Control and Optimization, 40(2), 516-524.
[8] Mertens J.-F. and S. Zamir (1971). The Value of Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games
with Lack of Information on Both Sides, International Journal of Game Theory, 1, 39-64.
[9] Rosenberg, D. and S. Sorin (2001). An Operator Approach to Zero-sum Repeated Games.
Israel Journal of Mathematics, 121, 221-246.
[10] Shapley, L. S. (1953) Stochastic Games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of
the U. S. A., 39, 1095-1100.
10
